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Abstract
The Turing Test is routinely understood as a behaviourist test for machine intelli-
gence. Diane Proudfoot (Rethinking Turing’s Test, Journal of Philosophy, 2013) 
has argued for an alternative interpretation. According to Proudfoot, Turing’s claim 
that intelligence is what he calls ‘an emotional concept’ indicates that he conceived 
of intelligence in response-dependence terms. As she puts it: ‘Turing’s criterion for 
“thinking” is…: x is intelligent (or thinks) if in the actual world, in an unrestricted 
computer-imitates-human game, x appears intelligent to an average interrogator’. 
The role of the famous test is thus to provide the conditions in which to examine the 
average interrogator’s responses. I shall argue that Proudfoot’s analysis falls short. 
The philosophical literature contains two main models of response-dependence, 
what I shall call the transparency model and the reference-fixing model. Proud-
foot resists the thought that Turing might have endorsed one of these models to the 
exclusion of the other. But the details of her own analysis indicate that she is, in 
fact, committed to the claim that Turing’s account of intelligence is grounded in a 
transparency model, rather than a reference-fixing one. By contrast, I shall argue 
that while Turing did indeed conceive of intelligence in response-dependence terms, 
his account is grounded in a reference-fixing model, rather than a transparency one. 
This is fortunate (for Turing), because, as an account of intelligence, the transpar-
ency model is arguably problematic in a way that the reference-fixing model isn’t.
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1  The Shape of Things
In a 1948 report to the National Physical Laboratory entitled ‘Intelligent Machin-
ery’, Alan Turing claims that intelligence is what he calls an ‘emotional con-
cept’. What does he mean by this? And what does that tell us about the place 
and function, in Turing’s own thinking, of his famous but controversial test for 
machine intelligence, the so-called Turing Test? In what follows, I shall offer 
answers to both of these questions. My strategy for doing so will be to develop 
a critical treatment of an important, state-of-the-art paper in Turing scholarship 
by Proudfoot (2013). Departing from the established mainstream understandings 
of Turing’s view (more on which later), and by focusing centrally on Turing’s 
aforementioned characterization of intelligence as an emotional concept, Proud-
foot argues that he pursued a response-dependence approach to thought and 
intelligence. (Turing didn’t systematically distinguish between testing for think-
ing and testing for intelligence. Proudfoot follows him in that, and so shall I.) In 
wielding the notion of response-dependence, Proudfoot is drawing on a recent 
philosophical literature in which the animating intuition is that there are certain 
concepts—the response-dependent ones—whose extensions (the set of things that 
count as falling under the concept) are, in some important sense, determined by 
particular sets of human responses (for canonical statements of the position, see 
e.g. Johnston 1989; Pettit 1991; Wright 1988). As a first-pass statement of this 
idea, consider the concept of red. If red is a response-dependent concept (which 
many philosophers think that it is), then, if an entity appears red to a particular 
kind of subject in certain specified conditions, then that entity is red. In other 
words, appearing red to a particular kind of subject in certain specified condi-
tions is sufficient for being red. Similarly, according to Proudfoot, on Turing’s 
response-dependence account of intelligence, it is an entity’s capacity to appear 
intelligent, to a particular kind of subject, in certain specified conditions, that suf-
fices for that entity to be intelligent. On this understanding of Turing, the role 
of the Turing Test is to provide the appropriate conditions for revealing the all-
important responses of the relevant subject.
In this paper, I shall argue that Proudfoot’s analysis of Turing’s view falls 
short. Although I shall not question—indeed I shall present new evidence in 
support of—the claim that Turing pursues a response-dependence approach to 
intelligence, I shall articulate and defend a version of that idea that differs sig-
nificantly from the one proposed by Proudfoot. Following a brief statement of 
where the target analysis by Proudfoot fits into the debate over how to under-
stand the Turing test, plus an introduction to the response-dependence approach 
itself, the argument of this paper unfolds as follows. The modern philosophical 
literature contains two main models of response-dependence, what I shall call the 
transparency model and the reference-fixing model. At a key moment in her treat-
ment, Proudfoot resists the thought that Turing might have endorsed (implicitly 
of course) one of these models to the exclusion of the other. In effect, her claim 
is that Turing’s own species of response-dependence did not distinguish between 
them. However, I shall argue that once the distinction between these models is 
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brought into proper view, Proudfoot’s official reluctance here is revealed to be 
problematic. In the first instance, this is because once one examines the details of 
her analysis, it transpires that she is, in fact, committed to the claim that Turing’s 
account of intelligence is grounded in one of these models rather than the other. 
More specifically, she is committed to the claim that Turing’s account of intelli-
gence is grounded in a transparency model of response-dependence, rather than a 
reference-fixing one.
This would be no more than a relatively minor expository clarification, were it 
not for the fact that the evidence also indicates that it is the diametrically opposite 
interpretation of Turing which is correct. In other words, the evidence suggests 
that Turing’s account of intelligence is grounded in a reference-fixing model of 
response-dependence, rather than a transparency one. As I shall go on to explain, 
this is a fortunate result (for Turing), because thinking of intelligence on the trans-
parency model arguably confronts a serious philosophical challenge, one that simply 
doesn’t arise if we think of intelligence on the reference-fixing model. And what this 
means is that, on my interpretation of Turing, his account of mind and intelligence 
is in far better shape than it is on Proudfoot’s interpretation. Thus this paper aims to 
deliver not only a critical response to Proudfoot’s analysis, but also a distinctive and 
improved positive interpretation of Turing on machine intelligence, one that boosts 
the likelihood that Turing was right. As a second advantage of the reference-fixing 
approach, I shall suggest that it increases the resilience of the Turing Test in the face 
of a certain common style of objection.
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that the dispute at the heart of this paper is 
more than a turf war amongst Turing-obsessives over an inconsequential historical 
wrinkle in his view. In addition to his ground-breaking technical innovations within 
the field of computing in general, Turing made an important contribution to foun-
dational philosophical issues in what we now call artificial intelligence (AI), most 
obviously in his 1950 Mind paper, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, the 
paper that is routinely taken to be the locus classicus of the Turing Test. This contri-
bution concerns the question of what it would be for a machine to think or be intel-
ligent, so it pivots centrally on the notions of thought and intelligence themselves. 
As a consequence, to understand and evaluate Turing’s place in the philosophy of 
AI, we need to get straight about what he meant by such terms. Moreover, it is worth 
registering the fact that, in the contemporary philosophical debate over the scope of 
response-dependence, it remains an open question whether it is correct to think of 
psychological phenomena such as thought and intelligence in response-dependence 
terms. Here it is surely tempting to see a prominent theory of mind such as Den-
nett’s intentional systems theory as encompassing a version of the claim that psy-
chological terms are response-dependent concepts. After all, if, as (Dennett 1981, 
p. 72, original emphasis) famously claims, ‘all there is to being a true believer is 
being a system whose behavior is reliably predictable via the intentional strategy’, 
where the intentional strategy is, at root, the practice of attributing psychological 
states to things, then the extension of any psychological concept (the set of entities 
which are, for example, genuine believers) is, in an important sense, determined by 
particular sets of human responses (such as finding some observed behaviour pre-
dictable as a result of attributing the concept in question). Dennett’s view continues 
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to be influential in cognitive science and AI, which is just one reason for holding 
that the prospects for a response-dependence approach to thought and intelligence 
is a topic of contemporary scientific, as well as philosophical, concern. And if, as I 
shall argue, Turing was a response-dependence theorist of a particular stripe about 
thought and intelligence, and if getting straight now about the precise shape of the 
view he advocated plausibly enables the Turing Test to take on a newly resilient sta-
tus within AI, that surely strengthens the hand of the response-dependence approach 
by enhancing its usefulness as a framework for conceptualizing and identifying 
machine intelligence. Thus although the present treatment is openly historical in 
its primary orientation, meaning that a full exploration of its wider contemporary 
implications is outside its scope, those implications surely extend beyond ‘mere’ 
historical book-keeping.
2  Looking for Machine Intelligence
In ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, Turing proposes his famous test as a 
replacement for the question ‘Can machines think?’ (Turing 1950, p. 441), a ques-
tion that he himself judges to be ‘too meaningless to deserve discussion’ (ibid. 449). 
As Turing sees things, to answer the question ‘Can machines think?’ directly, we 
would plausibly need to know what the words ‘machine’ and ‘think’ mean, but any 
attempt to provide such definitions would, at least if the aim is to reflect their normal 
usage, propel us into an ‘absurd’ statistical polling of the population in order to har-
vest their views on the matter, a project that would inevitably run aground on prob-
lems of imprecision and ambiguity (ibid. 441). As things turn out, what, for Turing, 
actually replaces the question ‘Can machines think?’ is an alternative question that, 
as we shall soon see, should be asked in relation to the Turing Test. But, first things 
first. What exactly is the test? Although ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ 
is routinely treated as the canonical presentation of the idea, at least three versions 
of the test appear within Turing’s treatments of, as we would now say, AI (Turing 
1948, 1950; and in Braithwaite et  al. 1952). Here is the version that will concern 
us in this paper. It is sometimes referred to as the unrestricted imitation game and it 
combines elements from more than one of Turing’s own descriptions.
In stage one of the test, a human interrogator sits in front of a computer termi-
nal, typing in questions or, more generally, conversational prompts for responses 
(which is what makes the game unrestricted) and reading responses from the screen, 
responses which come from two remote sources. In the text on the screen, these 
remote sources are labelled simply as A and B. Now, A and B themselves are 
located out of direct sensory contact with the interrogator, in a different room. As it 
happens, A is a man and B is a woman. The challenge confronting the interrogator is 
to correctly identify the source with the gender, that is, to identify A as the man and 
B as the woman. This task is rendered non-trivial by the fact that while it is the goal 
of the woman (B) to help the interrogator make the right identification, it is the goal 
of the man (A) to fool the interrogator into making the wrong identification.
How does this man-imitates-woman game bear on the question of machine 
intelligence? That’s where the second stage of the test comes in. The game is now 
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modified as follows. The role of A (the deceiver) is to be taken by a carefully pro-
grammed and adequately powerful (in terms of storage capacity and speed) digital 
computer. This is the kind of machine that Turing thought was in the right ballpark 
to exhibit intelligence, in virtue of the fact that digital computers were explicitly 
designed to carry out operations standardly performed by human computers (Turing 
1950, p. 444). The role of B (the truth-teller) is to be taken by a human being, with 
the gender of that participant presumably no longer intended to be salient (although 
this is a debated issue; for discussion, see Genova 1994; Traiger 2000; Copeland 
2000; Piccinini 2000; Moor 2001). Thus, when Turing returns to it later in ‘Com-
puting Machinery and Intelligence’, stage two of the imitation game looks like this: 
‘Let us fix our attention on one particular digital computer C. Is it true that by mod-
ifying this computer to have an adequate storage, suitably increasing its speed of 
action, and providing it with an appropriate programme, C can be made to play sat-
isfactorily the part of A in the imitation game, the part of B being taken by [a human 
being]?’ (Turing 1950, p. 448). This is the alternative question that replaces Turing’s 
initial question, ‘Can machines think?’.
So, the computer’s goal in the imitation game is to deceive the interrogator into 
misidentifying it as a human being, with the overall outcome of the test judged by 
reference to whether the percentage of correct identifications on the part of the inter-
rogator, over some agreed-to-be-adequate length of time, is worse than, the same as, 
or better than, the percentage of correct identifications on the part of the interrogator 
in the man-imitates-woman game. If the computer in stage two of the test is as good, 
or better, at deceiving the interrogator into misidentifying it as the human being, as 
the man in stage one is at deceiving the interrogator into misidentifying him as the 
woman, then the computer has successfully passed the Turing Test and has met what 
Turing calls his ‘criterion for ‘thinking’’ (Turing 1950, p. 443).
In the corridors of philosophy and AI, the Turing Test is routinely depicted as 
the principal driver for the conclusion that Turing was some sort of behaviourist 
about intelligence. More specifically, it is often claimed, citing the Turing test as 
evidence, that Turing held that it is logically sufficient for an entity to be intelligent, 
or to be a thinker, that that entity exhibits a certain behavioural profile, whatever 
might be going on in that entity’s innards (see e.g. Searle 1980). At first sight, this 
is not an unreasonable interpretation. As just one piece of evidence, in a 1952 BBC 
radio debate involving Turing and three others, Turing’s sometimes colleague, the 
mathematician, codebreaker and computer pioneer Max Newman, says: ‘If I have 
understood Turing’s test properly, you are not allowed to go behind the scenes and 
criticize the method, but must abide by the scoring on correct answers, found rea-
sonably quickly’ (in Braithwaite et al. 1952, p. 496). Within that discussion anyway, 
Turing doesn’t object to Newman’s interpretation. Still, behaviourism is not the only 
route. What might be described as the other mainstream alternative in the litera-
ture portrays the Turing Test as specifying the conditions under which a machine’s 
behaviour may justifiably count as the grounds for an induction regarding intelli-
gence (Moor 1976, 2001). On this view, if the machine passes the test, we have good 
inductive grounds to conclude that it is intelligent. If this is the right way to go, 
then Turing is not a behaviourist (since the test-passing behaviour isn’t logically suf-
ficient for the presence of intelligence), but it seems fair to say that, whatever the 
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merits of the inductive view, it hasn’t gripped the imagination of philosophers or AI 
researchers, in the way that the behaviourist interpretation has.
This is where Proudfoot (2013) offers us a third, potentially game-changing 
option, by arguing that Turing advocated a response-dependence account of intel-
ligence, according to which it is an entity’s capacity to appear intelligent, to a par-
ticular kind of subject, in certain specified conditions, that suffices for that entity to 
be intelligent. Call this the response-dependence interpretation of Turing on intel-
ligence, henceforth RDI. To understand and evaluate RDI, we will of course need 
to say more about who the relevant subject in question is and about the conditions 
in which that subject’s responses matter. It is in meeting these requirements that we 
will see how, within the response-dependence framework, the contribution of the 
Turing Test itself is reconceived.
3  The Response‑Dependence Interpretation of Turing on Intelligence
Let’s begin by focusing on the pivotal notion of response-dependence itself. As 
mentioned already, the basic intuition behind response-dependence is that there are 
certain concepts whose extensions are, in some important sense, determined by par-
ticular sets of human responses. To put some flesh on this, here is a general schema 
for response-dependence. (In fact, this schema, as I am about to formulate it, puts 
rather too much flesh on the intuition, even though it reflects a common way of elab-
orating it, but we’ll come back to that shortly.)
Take a property F, an entity x, a specified kind of observer O, and a specified 
set of conditions C. If our concept of F is a response-dependent concept, then 
the following will hold: it is a priori true that x is F if and only if O judges x to 
be F in C.
Here are two immediate clarifications that could themselves be prompts for dis-
cussion, but which I shall simply note. First, the term ‘judging’ should be heard 
in an essentially non-committal way, so as to allow for a range of different sorts 
of responses, given different cases of response-dependence. Such responses might 
include, among other things, having certain sensations, having certain feelings or 
emotions, and making considered evaluations. Secondly, it is incumbent upon the 
fan of response-dependence to specify O and C such that they do not produce what 
Wright (1989) calls ‘whatever-it-takes’ formulations. These are formulations that 
succeed in making the key claim a priori true, but only in a trivial way, say by speci-
fying O as those observers whose relevant responses accurately track F things, and 
C as whatever conditions are favourable for accurately tracking F things.
If Turing held that intelligence is a response-dependent concept, then, on the 
basis of our suggested schema, he would have adhered to the following principle: it 
is a priori true that x is intelligent if and only if O judges x to be intelligent in C. But 
now, with our sights set on Proudfoot’s analysis, we need to make some adjustments. 
First, as far as RDI is concerned, Proudfoot does not, in her text, explicitly mention 
the commitment to the a priori truth of the key embedded claim. Now, as it happens, 
the a priori status of that claim is an issue to which we shall return much later in this 
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paper. For now, however, in the interests of moving swiftly to a statement of Proud-
foot’s view, I shall simply suppress that element of the schema. Secondly, whereas 
our general schema is formulated in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions, Proudfoot formulates RDI only as a set of conditions that, when met, are suffi-
cient for the presence of thought and intelligence. As she puts the fundamental idea: 
‘On a response-dependence approach, it is an agent’s capacity to appear intelligent 
(to a normal subject in specified conditions) that suffices for intelligence’ (Proud-
foot 2013, p. 404). Although this elimination of the expected necessity requirement 
as part of a response-dependence approach is not explicitly justified as such dur-
ing Proudfoot’s analysis, it is, I think, bound up with two other parts of her inter-
pretation of Turing: her endorsement of the point that Turing was not attempting 
to provide a definition of intelligence, but rather a criterion for the presence of the 
phenomenon (ibid. 394); and the observation that it is reasonable to doubt whether 
Turing held that passing his test was necessary for the presence of thought (ibid. 
398). In any case, all we need to do is follow suit.
With the noted adjustments in place, here’s what we have so far as a statement 
of what, according to RDI, Turing believes: x is intelligent if O judges x to be intel-
ligent in C. The next steps are to specify the relevant O and the relevant C, and 
to say what ‘judging’ amounts to, in the particular case we care about. In effect, 
that’s what Proudfoot does, in the following, fuller statement of RDI: ‘According 
to the response-dependence interpretation… Turing’s criterion for “thinking” is…: 
x is intelligent (or thinks) if in the actual world, in an unrestricted computer-imi-
tates-human game, x appears intelligent to an average interrogator’ (ibid. 402). 
This formulation is immediately augmented by the following footnote: ‘[a]nd if the 
interrogator in that game is taken in no less frequently than the interrogator in a 
man-imitates-woman game’ (ibid. 402, note 54). This more detailed formulation of 
RDI tells us what we need to know.
The specified conditions in which subject responses should be tested (C) are two-
fold: (i) the relevant judgments are those that are made in an unrestricted, imitation 
game form of the Turing Test, as described earlier this paper, and (ii) that game 
must take place in the actual world. The first condition plays an important role in 
ensuring a fair playing field for the machine in the test. For example, versions of 
the test that diverge from its dual-player format, by involving sequentially presented 
single interviewees, some of which are machines and some of which are human 
beings, result in a bias effect in which human contestants are regularly misidenti-
fied as machines, presumably because the judges over-compensate due to a strong 
desire not be hoodwinked by a computer (see Copeland 2004a, pp. 488–489). The 
second condition prevents any slide into discussions about logically possible, but 
not possible in the actual world, machines that, in our fertile imaginations, pass the 
Turing test, but which we might be nervous about regarding as intelligent. Enor-
mous (beyond-reality-enormous, that is) look up tables, of one sort or another, are 
popular examples (Proudfoot 2013, p. 400).
The relevant observer, O, is identified as an ‘average interrogator’ in the imitation 
game. The word ‘average’ here needs to be given a specific interpretation, which, in 
modern parlance, we might express as being that the interrogator should not be an 
expert in AI. This respects Turing’s insistence that the interrogator should ‘not be 
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an expert about machines’ (in Braithwaite et al. 1952, p. 495). The reasons for this 
restriction on the choice of interrogator will be important later, so further discussion 
of the issue will be deferred until then.
Turning to what is designated by the term ‘judges’ in this context, the simple 
answer is revealed if one lines up the phrase ‘O judges x to be F’ from our generic 
response-dependence schema with the phrase ‘x appears intelligent to an average 
interrogator’ in Proudfoot’s detailed formulation of RDI. This immediately gives us 
the claim that the average interrogator judges the target entity to be intelligent when 
x appears intelligent to her. However, this is where the aforementioned footnote 
becomes significant. This cites the now-familiar success condition for the computer 
in the Turing Test, that is, that the interrogator in the computer-imitates-human 
game should make statistically as many or more relevant misidentifications as were 
made by the same interrogator in a prior man-imitates-woman game. As far as I can 
see, this should be understood not as adding anything substantial to RDI as formu-
lated in the main text (which explains why the information is placed in a footnote), 
but rather as an articulation of what it means here for an entity to appear intelli-
gent to the average interrogator (what it means for the average interrogator to judge 
the target entity to be intelligent). Meeting the stated success condition is just what 
‘appears intelligent’ means, in the context of the game.
Put all this together and RDI is plausibly complete. Whereas a response-depend-
ence account of the concept of red might naturally appeal to the red-sensation 
responses of a normal subject operating in good lighting conditions, RDI will appeal 
to the judgments of the average interrogator in the unrestricted imitation game, 
played in the actual world. And now we can see why RDI, as Proudfoot devel-
ops and defends it, encompasses a specific and, in comparison with the canonical, 
behaviourist interpretation of Turing described earlier, a notably different role for 
the Turing Test. As Proudfoot (2013, p. 395) observes, on the behaviourist interpre-
tation of Turing, it remains something of a mystery just why he constructed the test 
as the imitation game at all. Why make the responses of an interrogator central to 
the test when one could simply check to see if the machine is capable of executing a 
series of behavioural tasks? On RDI, however, no such mystery is established, since 
the interrogator’s responses necessarily perform a perspicuous and important func-
tion in relation to determining the extension of the concept of intelligence. More 
specifically, according to RDI, the multi-faceted contribution of the Turing Test, in 
the form of the unrestricted imitation game, is to provide the following: a specifica-
tion of the conditions under which the relevant subject’s responses should be exam-
ined; an articulation of what the relevant responses are; and part of the profile of the 
relevant subject, with the remainder provided by Turing’s extra requirement that the 
interrogator be ‘average’.
4  Two Models of Response‑Dependence
So far, so good. But now it’s time to make the transition to a more critical register. 
To do this, we need to revisit, yet again, our understanding of response-dependence. 
There are, in fact, two main models of response-dependence in the philosophical 
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literature. These are sometimes distinguished by asking whether the focus of the 
view is on the concept under consideration or on the property of which it is the 
concept. For example, when one gives a response-dependence account of red, one 
might ask whether that is intended as an understanding of our concept of red or as 
an understanding of the property of being red. Proudfoot herself adopts this way 
of drawing the distinction at issue, and, in a brief remark, immediately dismisses 
any consideration of it in relation to RDI as inappropriate. She states, without fur-
ther argument, that it is ‘anachronistic’ to ‘ask whether Turing proposes a response-
dependence understanding of the property, rather than the concept, of intelligence—
in fact his remarks suggest both’ (Proudfoot 2013, p. 308, my emphasis). Therefore, 
although Proudfoot clearly endorses the thought that there is a perfectly respectable 
distinction to be drawn between two models of response-dependence, she officially 
rejects the further thought that Turing embraced one of these models to the exclu-
sion of other.
In order to assess this (as we shall see) surprisingly important moment in Proud-
foot’s analysis, we need to begin by getting clearer about the very distinction that 
Proudfoot has in mind, that is, the distinction between the two main models of 
response-dependence. In truth, it is misleading to separate these models using the 
simple ‘concept versus property’ locution, since, as Crispin Wright (personal com-
munication) has pointed out to me, and in harmony with the way I introduced the 
notion of response-dependence earlier in this paper, both models think of certain 
human responses as, in some important way, determining the extension of the con-
cept in question. In other words, both models propose that certain human responses 
have significant implications of some sort for which things in the world fall under 
the concept in question and so instantiate the property of which it is the concept. 
What really separates them is not whether the focus is on the concept or on the prop-
erty, but rather their different ways of conceiving the relationship between the rel-
evant set of responses and the property in the extension-determining process.
Consider first the model of response-dependence that was provisionally articu-
lated as focusing on the property. Put more precisely, the key feature of this model 
is that the target concept is transparent with respect to the property of which it is the 
concept. Let’s call this model of response-dependence the transparency model. On 
the transparency model, there is nothing more to instantiating the property in ques-
tion than generating certain specified responses in certain specified subjects under 
certain specified conditions. Accordingly, if red is a response-dependent concept, 
then there is nothing more to being red than generating red sensations in normally 
sighted subjects under normal lighting conditions. And because, on this view, it is 
sufficient for something to instantiate a target property that it be such as to generate 
a certain specified response in the relevant subject in certain specified conditions, 
having the specified response necessarily acquaints the responding subject with the 
presence of the property in question. Of course, what I have just given is a very gen-
eral exposition of the model on offer, and the completion of the view would involve 
significant philosophical work and may demand some tinkering with the details (see 
e.g. the different versions of this approach pursued by Johnston and Wright, as men-
tioned earlier). However, for our purposes here, the general picture will do.
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Now consider the other main model of response-dependence—the one that was 
previously articulated as focusing on the concept. The key feature of this model is 
that the target concept may be opaque with respect to the property of which it is 
the concept. Our responses play an essentially provisional, but nevertheless still 
important, role in determining the extension of the concept. However, that role 
is an indicative or reference-fixing one, where what is indicated or referred to is 
some presumed, non-relational, response-independent essence—what we might 
think of as the underlying nature of the property in question. Ultimately, it is this 
underlying nature that determines the extension of the concept. Let’s call this sec-
ond model of response dependence the reference-fixing model. To illustrate the 
model, consider a natural kind such as water. We start out with a concept of water 
delineated by a set of human judgments or responses, in this case a combina-
tion of sensory appearances such as feels wet, is colourless and tasteless, and so 
on. This set of responses provisionally determines an extension by, in a sense, 
attaching it to  a presumed, underlying physical essence (as it turns out,  H2O), 
which we understand to be the final determiner of the extension of the concept. 
To capture the kind of response-dependence in play here, one might say that, on 
this model, water is introduced as whatever it is that accounts for the charac-
teristic set of responses that normal subjects experience in its presence. Notice 
immediately that, in contrast with the transparency model, there is now more to 
instantiating the target property than generating a certain specified response in 
certain specified subjects under certain specified conditions. So there is more to 
being water than generating the highlighted set of sensations in normally experi-
encing subjects under everyday sensory access conditions. Water has an underly-
ing essence with which we are not directly acquainted, but which is indicated by 
the responses in question. Once again, what I have just given is a very general 
exposition of the model on offer, and the completion of the view would involve 
significant philosophical work and may demand some tinkering with the details 
(see e.g. the work of Pettit mentioned earlier). However, for our purposes here, 
the general picture will do.
With our two models of response-dependence in hand, it is now possible for us to 
state RDI in two different forms, according to whether the response-dependency in 
question is of the transparency or the reference-fixing variety.
RDI-transparency: Turing holds that there is nothing more to a computer 
being intelligent than being judged as such by an average interrogator in an 
unrestricted computer-imitates-human game, where ‘being judged as intelli-
gent’ just means ‘achieves at least the same number of misidentifications on 
the part of that interrogator as the male participant achieves in a prior man-
imitates-woman game’.
RDI-reference-fixing: Turing holds that where the average interrogator in an 
unrestricted computer-imitates-human game judges a computer to be intelli-
gent (makes at least the same number of computer-is-human-misidentifications 
in that game as man-is-woman-misidentifications in a prior man-imitates-
woman game), that judgment provisionally determines the extension of the 
concept of intelligence to include the computer. It does so by presuming that 
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the computer instantiates an underlying essence of intelligence that ultimately 
determines the extension of the concept of intelligence.
Obviously, more needs to be said about what is meant by ‘underlying essence of 
intelligence’ in RDI-reference-fixing. We’ll come back to that issue later.
Returning now to Proudfoot’s analysis of Turing, how should we respond to her 
claim that Turing proposes a response-dependence understanding of both the prop-
erty and the concept of intelligence? To answer that question, we need to restate 
her claim in light of our refined way of making the distinction in question. At first 
sight, the obvious restatement might seem to be that Turing proposes that we should 
understand the concept of intelligence in terms of both the transparency model and 
the reference-fixing model simultaneously. After all, structurally speaking, Proud-
foot’s thought is that there are two models of response-dependence and, with respect 
to intelligence, Turing advocates both. But now something has gone wrong: for 
although the two models could apply simultaneously to different concepts—per-
haps the transparency model works for red and the reference-fixing model works 
for water—the very same concept cannot, at the same time, be both transparent and 
opaque with respect to the property of which it is the concept. So, that cannot be the 
charitable way to restate Proudfoot’s claim. The correct resolution of this situation, 
I suggest, is for Proudfoot to be understood as claiming that Turing adopts the trans-
parency model. For while both models begin with an elucidation of a target concept 
in terms of certain responses in specified conditions, it is on the transparency model 
that there exists the closer or more direct relationship between the accompanying 
target property (the property of which the target concept is a concept) and the afore-
mentioned responses and conditions. On RDI-transparency, there is nothing more 
to a machine being intelligent than its being judged as such by the identified subject 
in the specified conditions. As one might crudely put it, according to RDI-transpar-
ency, when one gives an account of the concept of intelligence in terms of certain 
responses in specified conditions, one thereby says all there is to say about the prop-
erty of intelligence. That isn’t the case according to RDI-reference-fixing. On RDI-
reference-fixing, the instantiation of the property of intelligence is ultimately deter-
mined by which entities in the world realize some presumed response-independent 
underlying essence of intelligence. So it is the transparency model that offers us the 
natural scaffold for the thought that Turing adopted a response-dependence account 
of both the concept and the property of intelligence.
The interpretative conclusion just drawn already suggests something important, 
namely that Proudfoot’s version of RDI depicts Turing as pursuing one model of 
response-dependence rather than the other. This means that her official dismissal of 
the idea of applying the distinction in question to Turing’s thinking about intelli-
gence in order to ask which of the two models he embraced is, by her own lights, 
misplaced. However, one would be forgiven for complaining that the rather swift 
moves just made reek of a technical knock-out and, as Fodor (1987) once quipped, 
nobody wants to win anything by one of those. So we need to work harder. It is 
time to investigate for ourselves some of the very passages from Turing’s writings 
on machine intelligence on which Proudfoot bases her case for RDI. Over the next 
two sections, I shall argue that a careful reading of those passages indicates not only 
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that Proudfoot is, in fact, committed to the claim that Turing’s account of intelli-
gence is grounded in a transparency model of response-dependence rather than a 
reference-fixing one, but that this is a mistaken interpretation of Turing, because 
Turing’s account of intelligence is actually grounded in a reference-fixing model of 
response-dependence rather than a transparency one.
5  Intelligence as an Emotional Concept
In ‘Intelligent Machinery’, Turing claims that the concept of intelligence is what 
he calls an emotional concept or emotional idea. This claim occurs during Turing’s 
response to a brace of reasons that he identifies as explaining a widespread resist-
ance to the very idea of machine intelligence. Those reasons are that humankind will 
refuse to admit the possibility that it ‘will have any rivals in intellectual power’ and 
the ‘religious belief that any attempt to construct [intelligent] machines is a sort of 
Promethean irreverence’ (Turing 1948, p. 410). Turing’s first reaction is to state that 
objections based on these reasons ‘do not really need to be refuted’, because they are 
‘purely emotional’ (ibid. 411). In other words, whatever ‘being purely emotional’ 
means, if an objection falls under that description, then that is justification enough 
to ignore that objection. This will be important later. Having lodged this response, 
however, Turing proceeds to make an additional point that seems to pull in pre-
cisely the opposite direction, namely that the objections under consideration ‘can-
not be wholly ignored, because the idea of ‘intelligence’ is itself emotional rather 
than mathematical’ (ibid. 411). Turing’s thought, as I understand it, is that because 
the target idea—that of machine intelligence—features a concept—that of intelli-
gence—that is itself an emotional concept, it is inevitable that objections to the tar-
get idea based on similarly emotional concepts, objections that might otherwise be 
ignored on that very basis, have some traction. Clearly we need to understand what 
it is for a concept to be emotional, and to do that we need to understand the distinc-
tion that Turing draws between emotional ideas and mathematical ones.
At the end of ‘Intelligent Machinery’, Turing states that intelligence is an emo-
tional concept because the ‘extent to which we regard something as behaving in an 
intelligent manner is determined as much by our own state of mind and training as 
by the properties of the object under consideration’ (ibid. 431). Here Turing distin-
guishes between two sorts of factors: (i) the properties of the object under considera-
tion, and (ii) other factors that determine our judgments about the object in question, 
namely our own state of mind and training. Building on this while extrapolating 
from the specific case of intelligence, and putting just a few words into Turing’s 
mouth, here is what I take to be Turing’s distinction between emotional ideas and 
mathematical ones. A concept is mathematical if and only if, in judgments regarding 
whether that concept is instantiated in an object under consideration, only factors of 
sort (i) are relevant. A concept is emotional if and only if, in judgments regarding 
whether that concept is instantiated in an object under consideration, factors of sort 
(ii) weigh as heavily as those of sort (i).
As Turing explains things, factors of sort (ii)—the sort of factors whose equal 
role in judgments regarding the extension of the concept in question determines that 
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that concept is emotional in nature—include the judging subject’s state of mind and 
her training. So now what do these terms signify? Given our everyday use of the 
phrase ‘state of mind’, it might seem that Turing is straightforwardly directing our 
attention to an affective component in the relevant judgments. That fits, of course, 
with Turing’s designation of the concepts in question as ‘emotional’. But while 
the reasons that Turing identifies as being behind the resistance to machine intel-
ligence—namely human chauvinism and religion—credibly have affective dimen-
sions, it is worth stressing that they are more like deep background perspectives on 
the world that only allow the world to open up or make sense in certain ways. In any 
case, Turing moves beyond the affective altogether in his explication of factors of 
sort (ii) when he includes the judge’s training as such a factor. ‘Training’ refers to 
how much the relevant judging subject knows about the subject matter or domain 
under examination. Turing’s thought here is striking, and I shall return to it below, 
but his general idea is that the more a judging subject is able to explain and predict 
the behaviour of an entity, the less likely it is that that subject will attribute intelli-
gence to that entity.
One way to appreciate, for ourselves, how the foregoing material might func-
tion as a driver for some form of RDI is simply to read the term ‘regard’ in the 
phrase ‘extent to which we regard something as behaving in an intelligent manner’ 
as rightly regard, which, in context, doesn’t seem unreasonable. It then becomes 
entirely plausible that, on Turing’s view, whether or not an entity is intelligent (i.e., 
whether it falls under the extension of the concept of intelligence), depends, in an 
important way, on the state of mind and training of the subject making the judg-
ment (i.e., on a subject’s responses in certain conditions). So it is tempting to see 
a clear route from thinking of intelligence as an emotional concept to thinking of 
it as a response-dependent concept. Of course it is not until the fully worked out 
version of RDI is on the table that we can see how this might really work, and it is 
credit to Proudfoot’s ingenuity that she manages to show how the Turing test allows 
us to fill in the all-important details for the machine intelligence case. As we have 
seen, these details include: who counts as the relevant judging subject (the average 
interrogator, where average means not an expert about machines); what the appro-
priate conditions are in which her judgments should be made (the unrestricted com-
puter-imitates-human game played in the real world); and what counts as judging 
(the comparison between the percentage of misidentifications in the man-imitates-
woman and the computer-imitates-human rounds). But even though there is a sense 
in which Proudfoot is manifestly going beyond what Turing actually says here, it is 
grist to her mill that an early formulation of the Turing test appears, in ‘Intelligent 
Machinery’, immediately after the unpacking of what it means for a concept to be 
emotional (ibid. 431).
So, let’s agree that RDI, in some form, undoubtedly has legs. Are they transpar-
ency legs or reference-fixing legs? That is the question. In the next section I shall 
argue that, in tension with her official position, Proudfoot’s analysis ends up por-
traying Turing as an advocate of a transparency model of response-dependence in 




6  Turing and Response‑Dependence: Which Model?
Proudfoot claims that, for Turing, no computational account of the inner pro-
cesses that generate behaviour could ever establish the presence of intelligence. 
As she puts it: ‘Evidence of a machine’s inner computation is evidence of (to 
use Turing’s words) “the properties of the object under consideration”—in mod-
ern terminology, the machine’s response-independent properties. However, it is 
not evidence of any response-dependent property, such as intelligence’ (Proud-
foot 2013, p. 403). This indicates that Proudfoot’s Turing is working with the 
transparency model of response-dependence. Why? Because although Proud-
foot’s claim makes perfect sense on the transparency model, it is at odds with the 
reference-fixing model. On the transparency model, since there is nothing more 
to a computer being intelligent than being judged as such by an average interro-
gator in an unrestricted computer-imitates human game, the inner computational 
profile of the machine simply does not bear on the issue. On the reference-fixing 
model, however, an inner computational profile could indeed provide evidence of 
intelligence, by being elected as the underlying nature of the property to which 
the relevant responses of the interrogator in the imitation game are attached in 
fixing the reference of the concept of intelligence, that is, by being the underly-
ing nature that ultimately determines the extension of that concept. Thus, on the 
reference-fixing model, just as  H2O provides evidence of the presence of water, 
so a particular computational profile (whatever the right one may be—classical, 
connectionist, predictive processing or otherwise) may provide evidence of the 
presence of intelligence.
It is worth pausing to emphasize the point that, when it comes to intelligence, 
the response-independent underlying nature that we are taking Turing to advo-
cate as the ultimate extension-determiner is not a low-level physical structure, 
as it is in the case of water and  H2O, but a computational profile, a higher-order 
functional kind that, in line with a well-established understanding of the meta-
physics of computational systems, might be multiply realized in a range of dif-
ferent physical systems. No doubt this is a good thing, for at least three reasons. 
First, the history that we teach undergraduates in introductory philosophy of mind 
classes emphasizes the transition from the type–type mind-brain identity theory 
to functionalism precisely as a way of respecting the point that, while we might 
still hope to find a shared cognition-delineating functional profile across think-
ers, we gave up the hope of ever finding a shared cognition-delineating physical 
profile. Just remember those Martian thinkers who are made of different physi-
cal stuff to us. And, of course, conceiving intelligence in terms of computational 
states and processes is just a way of implementing functionalism. Secondly, advo-
cating a functional/computational underlying nature for intelligence is one way of 
respecting the widely held view in AI—a view that, as we have seen, fuels scepti-
cism regarding the credentials of the behaviouristic version of the Turing test—
that, whatever the behaviour, not any old inner profile will do as a wellspring of 
genuine intelligence. And thirdly, introducing the possibility of a computation-
ally specified underlying essence of intelligence blocks a perhaps tempting line 
527
1 3
Deceptive Appearances: the Turing Test, Response-Dependence,…
of thought which goes like this: because it is highly unlikely that intelligence has 
an underlying physical nature, the only response-dependence option available is 
the transparency model. If the relevant underlying nature is a functionally/compu-
tationally characterized one, the failure to find a physical one is beside the point. 
Anyway, what matters right now is this: the fact that the underlying nature in 
view when we focus on intelligence is to be functionally, rather than physically, 
characterized doesn’t affect the basic shape of the view on offer. And the upshot 
of that is that it’s only on the transparency model that response-independent prop-
erties provide no evidence of intelligence. Therefore, Proudfoot must be attribut-
ing that model to Turing.
It must be admitted that the foregoing interpretative conclusion flies in the face of 
some of what Proudfoot officially says. For example, she appeals, in part, to Pettit’s 
(1991) understanding of response-dependence to save Turing from an unpalatable 
in-the-eye-of-the-beholder anti-realism about intelligence, even though Pettit is the 
chief architect of the reference-fixing model (Proudfoot 2013, p. 405). And, as part 
of the same resistance, she notes explicitly the part of Turing’s definition of intelli-
gence as an emotional concept (see earlier) which guarantees that, when it comes to 
determining the extension of that concept, properties of the object under considera-
tion—properties which, as we have seen, include the machine’s computational pro-
file—matter just as much as the responses of the relevant subject as determined by 
her state of mind and training (ibid. 405). And that, as we have just seen, is in tune 
with the reference-fixing model in a way that it isn’t in tune with the transparency 
model. The diagnosis of why such appeals persist in Proudfoot’s analysis is that they 
are a symptom of her aforementioned explicit refusal to choose between the two 
models in relation to Turing’s views. Given the argument just developed, the onus 
is, I think, firmly on Proudfoot to justify why she has access to these elements of the 
reference-fixing model.
Having concluded that Proudfoot attributes the transparency model to Turing, I 
shall now suggest that she has made a mistake in so doing. In fact, we have just reg-
istered one consideration that tells in this direction, namely that the reference-fixing 
interpretation of Turing makes better sense of the way in which ‘the properties of 
the object under consideration’ figure in his definition of emotional concepts. But 
there is more to be said, beginning with a switch in attention back to the alternative 
way of expressing the dual dependence of emotional concepts, that is, by concentrat-
ing again on the fact that, for Turing, the extensions of such concepts are determined 
as much by the judging subject’s state of mind and training as they are by the prop-
erties of the object under consideration.
First consider training. As we know, Turing claims that the more successfully a 
judging subject, faced with the behaviour of an entity, is able to explain and predict 
the behaviour of that entity—the better trained the subject is in the domain of per-
formance—the less likely it is that she will attribute intelligence to it. Thus, in the 
1952 radio debate, he says:
As soon as one can see the cause and effect working themselves out in the 
brain, one regards it as not being thinking, but a sort of unimaginative don-
key work. From this point of view one might be tempted to define thinking as 
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consisting of ‘those mental processes that we don’t understand’. If this is right, 
then to make a thinking machine is to make one which does interesting things 
without our really understanding quite how it is done. (In Braithwaite et  al. 
1952, p. 500)
Observations such as these lead Turing to conclude that, in the imitation game, 
the interrogator should ‘not be an expert about machines’ (ibid. 495). This in turn 
leads Proudfoot, in response-dependence mode, to specify that the relevant judg-
ing subject in RDI is the ‘average interrogator’. Now, here is something obvious but 
crucial. When Turing says that the human chauvinist or someone with a certain reli-
gious commitment will, because of their state of mind, refuse to countenance the 
possibility of machine intelligence, he clearly believes that person to be in error. 
And surely he thinks the same about the trained AI expert who, because she knows 
plenty (too much) about programs and algorithms and so can, at least in a general, 
way, explain and predict the behaviour of a machine, declines to attribute genuine 
intelligence to it. The question, then, is how to explain such errors, on a response-
dependence model.
On the transparency model, the judging subject’s ‘error’ is presumably to be 
handled entirely by the fact that the AI expert is not the average interrogator. The 
expert’s responses are ruled to be outside the set that, according to the relevant 
response-dependence schema, determine the extension of the concept. Put another, 
deliberately tendentious way, the domain-expert is wrong simply because she disa-
grees with the domain-novice. There is surely something intuitively uncomfortable 
about this way of proceeding. The AI expert is wrong, but it seems false to say that 
that’s because she’s unqualified to judge or simply because she disagrees with the 
domain-novice. That is presumably not Turing’s intention. Fortunately, for RDI, the 
reference-fixing model supplies us with an alternative strategy. On that model, our 
capacity to criticize the domain-expert is explained by the fact that, even though the 
responses of the average interrogator are used provisionally to fix the reference of 
the concept of intelligence, something else is elected to play the role of ultimately 
determining the extension of that concept, something about which even the AI-
expert may be wrong, namely the response-independent computational profile that 
constitutes the underlying nature of intelligence. So, by interpreting Turing’s views 
on intelligence according to the reference-fixing model, we can have our response-
dependence cake and yet eat it with a healthy side plate of plausibility when it comes 
to making good sense of his treatment of how training affects the credentials of cer-
tain subject-responses in the Turing test.
7  Two Advantages of the Reference‑Fixing Model
In this section, I shall suggest that, when it comes to the phenomenon of intelli-
gence, the reference-fixing model of response-dependence enjoys two advantages 
over the transparency-based alternative. This means that my Turing, who applies the 
reference-fixing model, is in better shape than Proudfoot’s Turing, who (ultimately) 
applies the transparency model. The first of these advantages concerns a potentially 
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dangerous circularity that confronts the transparency approach but not the reference-
fixing approach. To be clear, my aim is not to establish, beyond all reasonable doubt, 
that the circularity in question is decisively damaging, only that it’s a threat. So I 
shall not explore potential responses to it from the perspective of the transparency 
model. It is enough for my purposes that having to deal with that threat is a head-
ache that, on my interpretation of Turing, he doesn’t have.
On the transparency model, there is nothing more to instantiating a target prop-
erty than generating certain specified responses in certain specified subjects under 
certain specified conditions. Thus, canonically, there is nothing more to being red 
than generating red sensations in normally sighted subjects under normal lighting 
conditions. Notice that here there is not even a whiff of circularity. The account of 
what is sufficient to instantiate the property of being red is given in terms of cer-
tain specified perceptual experiences (red sensations), not in terms of being red. 
Now consider the example of intelligence. Applying the transparency model, one 
is encouraged to give an account of what is sufficient to instantiate the property of 
being intelligent in terms of judgments (here, those made by the appropriate interro-
gator in the Turing test) that are themselves instantiations of intelligence. Here there 
does seem to be a circularity in evidence and, given the risk that the account on offer 
will be rendered uninformative, it is not obviously benign.
The reference-fixing model avoids this alleged circularity, because its generic 
structure involves a gap, one that doesn’t exist on the transparency model, between 
the specified responses and the property of which the target concept is a concept. 
This gap is opened up by the fact that the responses that provisionally fix the referent 
of the concept are only contingently connected to the response-independent underly-
ing nature that ultimately determines the extension of the concept. In effect, that’s 
just another way of developing the point that the reference-fixing model character-
izes the responses in question as provisionally determining the extension of a con-
cept by attaching it to a presumed, underlying essence which we understand to be 
the final determiner of that extension, such that what is ultimately sufficient for an 
entity to instantiate the property in question is that it realizes that presumed underly-
ing nature.
Notice that there is no longer any cast-iron guarantee that the specified reference-
fixing responses, whatever they may be, will line up fully with the extension-deter-
mining response-independent underlying nature, whatever it may be. There are two 
kinds of possible mismatch. The first is that there may be instances of the underlying 
nature that do not produce the characteristic specified responses. Wright (as reported 
by Gundersen 2006) gives the example of a strange but tiny sample of  H2O some-
where in Siberia that does not produce the usual water-y sensory appearances in 
human beings, even in the most favourable of conditions. Surely, given its chemical 
structure, we would still want to class the Siberian sample as a case of water. The 
second kind of mismatch is the ‘fool’s gold’ phenomenon: there may be a substance 
that would consistently generate the characteristic specified responses associated 
with a certain concept while realizing such a different underlying nature to that dis-
covered in the overwhelming majority of the reference-fixing cases that we would 
not want to include it within the extension of the concept. The contingency in force 
means that neither of these mismatches can be ruled out a priori.
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That last point clears the way to seeing why, from one perspective, this can all 
look like a bug in the reference-fixing model. Recall that the canonical way to for-
mulate response-dependence is in terms of a principle such as: it is a priori true 
that x is F if and only if O judges x to be F in C. But the contingency in force 
within the reference-fixing model, as illustrated by the mismatches just described, 
means that that model plausibly loses access to the a priori aspect of this principle. 
Indeed, notice that even if we formulate the key principle only as a sufficient condi-
tion (which, in effect, is what Proudfoot does), fool’s-gold-style cases will still do 
enough, within the reference-fixing framework, to disrupt its a priori status. Still, 
one person’s bug is another person’s feature, and, as I am about to argue, when it 
comes to the application of response-dependence to the concept of intelligence, the 
gap in question is a positive boon. So, although the fact that Proudfoot doesn’t lay 
emphasis on the a priori aspect of the usual reference-fixing principle means that 
that dimension of the view has not so far been a focus of the analysis presented in 
this paper, it turns out that it matters.
Here’s why. When the reference-fixing model is applied to the concept of intel-
ligence, and played out by way of the Turing Test, here’s how things go: the intel-
ligent responses made by the appropriate interrogator in the test provisionally deter-
mine the extension of the concept of intelligence to include the computer, but the 
account of what is finally sufficient for the computer to instantiate the property of 
intelligence is given in terms of realizing the computational profile that constitutes 
the underlying nature of intelligence. Here there is no threat of circularity, and what 
fundamentally makes that so is the gap (the contingency of the connection) between 
the responses that provisionally fix the referent of the concept and the extension-
determining underlying nature. So, given that, on my interpretation, Turing thinks 
of intelligence on the reference-fixing model, he is, on this score anyway, headache-
free. Proudfoot’s Turing, who endorses the transparency model, isn’t.
The second advantage of the reference-fixing version of the response-dependence 
view of intelligence also emerges in the vicinity of the point that, on that model, a 
particular inner computational profile could constitute the underlying essence that 
ultimately determines the extension of the concept of intelligence. If we place the 
Turing Test within this framework, we arguably strengthen its resilience in the face 
of a common objection. That objection turns on the idea that we can conceive of 
situations in which, although the machine passes the test, we would nevertheless 
withhold the attribution of intelligence, on the grounds that it features an inappropri-
ate inner profile. The behaviouristic version of the Turing Test is often thought to 
succumb to this very objection, precisely because it cannot make room for any such 
withholding. And now notice that a Turing Test placed within the transparency-
based response-dependence framework faces an analogous difficulty, since, within 
that framework, there is nothing more to a machine being intelligent than its being 
judged as such by the average interrogator in the imitation game. Although this car-
ries us beyond behaviourism, it doesn’t create enough conceptual space for the inner 
computational profile of the machine to count as evidence regarding the presence 
of intelligence. By contrast, the inductive version of the Turing Test would create 
adequate conceptual space, but, of course, like the behaviourist version, it will strug-
gle to do proper justice to the interrogator-centred, as opposed to task-centred, form 
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of the test, as Turing himself develops it. However, with the test restaged within 
the reference-fixing framework, things look encouragingly different. When the inter-
rogator judges that a machine is intelligent, what she does is provisionally deter-
mine the extension of the concept of intelligence to include that machine, by pre-
suming that it instantiates the relevant computational profile. It is entirely consistent 
with this approach that we may later withdraw the attribution of intelligence, if we 
discover that, in fact, no such instantiation obtains. And that plausibly renders the 
Turing Test resistant to the tabled objection, and so enables it to take on a newly 
resilient status within AI.
8  Concluding Remarks
Reading historical thinkers through the lenses of contemporary philosophical frame-
works is always a hazardous business, but it can also be illuminating. Turing’s claim 
that intelligence is an ‘emotional concept’ is rightly interpreted as indicating that he 
held a response-dependence view of thought and intelligence. But response-depend-
ence comes in two varieties, and Turing is better characterized as pursuing the refer-
ence-fixing variety, rather than the transparency one. That fact, I have argued, makes 
his view all the more compelling, in part because of what it tells us about the form 
and resilience of the Turing Test.
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